Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1647

[3] Another reading omits the [Greek:——]; the meaning of the whole passage would be exactly the same—it would then run, “if he had been convinced of the rightness of what he does, _i.e._ if he were now acting on conviction, he might stop in his course on a change of conviction.”

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1167

But at the same time it must perhaps be admitted, that it seems no father ever _would_ sever himself utterly from a son, except in a case of exceeding depravity: because, independently of the natural Friendship, it is like human nature not to put away from one’s self the assistance which a son might render.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1151

In this Legal kind the obligation is clear and admits of no dispute, the friendly element is the delay in requiring its discharge: and for this reason in some countries no actions can be maintained at Law for the recovery of such debts, it being held that they who have dealt on the footing of credit must be content to abide the issue.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 422

For, to take the analogous case, the sick man cannot with a wish be well again, yet in a supposable case he is voluntarily ill because he has produced his sickness by living intemperately and disregarding his physicians. There was a time then when he might have helped being ill, but now he has let himself go he cannot any longer; just as he who has let a stone out of his hand cannot recall it,[14] and yet it rested with him to aim and throw it, because the origination was in his power.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 655

By the way, as to individual education, in respect of which a man is simply good without reference to others, whether it is the province of πολιτικὴ or some other science we must determine at a future time: for it may be it is not the same thing to be a good man and a good citizen in every case.[8]

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1264

We have said before, that whatever is naturally good is also in itself good and pleasant to the good man; now the fact of living, so far as animals are concerned, is characterised generally by the power of sentience, in man it is characterised by that of sentience, or of rationality (the faculty of course being referred to the actual operation of the faculty, certainly the main point is the actual operation of it); so that living seems mainly to consist in the act of sentience or exerting rationality: now the fact of living is in itself one of the things that are good and pleasant (for it is a definite totality, and whatever is such belongs to the nature of good), but what is naturally good is good to the good man: for which reason it seems to be pleasant to all.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1488

It is true that in a perfect moral state emotion will be rare, but then this will have been gained by regular process, being the legitimate result of the law that “passive impressions weaken as active habits are strengthened, by repetition.” If musical instruments are making discord, I may silence or I may bring them into harmony in either case I get rid of discord, but in the latter I have the positive enjoyment of music.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1638

See Book X. chap. iv. [Greek: hosper oud hæ hygieia kai ho iatros homoios aitia esti tou ugiainein].

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 493

Well then, that excess with respect to pleasures is absence of self-control, and blameworthy, is plain. But viewing these habits on the side of pains, we find that a man is not said to have the virtue for withstanding them (as in the case of Courage), nor the vice for not withstanding them; but the man destitute of self-control is such, because he is pained more than he ought to be at not obtaining things which are pleasant (and thus his pleasure produces pain to him), and the man of Perfected Self-Mastery is such in virtue of not being pained by their absence, that is, by having to abstain from what is pleasant.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 202

As we have said already, the addition of prosperity of this kind does seem necessary to complete the idea of Happiness; hence some rank good fortune, and others virtue, with Happiness.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 451

We will take first that which bears most resemblance to the true, the Courage of Citizenship, so named because the motives which are thought to actuate the members of a community in braving danger are the penalties and disgrace held out by the laws to cowardice, and the dignities conferred on the Brave; which is thought to be the reason why those are the bravest people among whom cowards are visited with disgrace and the Brave held in honour.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1020

(“There must be something in what most folks say,”) only as one and the same nature or state neither is nor is thought to be the best, so neither do all pursue the same Pleasure, Pleasure nevertheless all do. Nay further, what they pursue is, perhaps, not what they think nor what they would say they pursue, but really one and the same: for in all there is some instinct above themselves. But the bodily Pleasures have received the name exclusively, because theirs is the most frequent form and that which is universally partaken of; and so, because to many these alone are known they believe them to be the only ones which exist.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1295

Here then we will terminate our discourse of Friendship. The next thing is to go into the subject of Pleasure.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 32

This knowledge is not, though it includes knowledge of the nature of man and his circumstances, it is knowledge of what is best—of man’s supreme end or good.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1183

for one who has been ransomed out of the hands of robbers to ransom in return his ransomer, be he who he may, or to repay him on his demand though he has not been taken by robbers, or to ransom his own father? for it would seem that a man ought to ransom his father even in preference to himself.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1176

And it would seem the same rule should be laid down for those who are connected with one another as teachers and learners of philosophy; for here the value of the commodity cannot be measured by money, and, in fact, an exactly equivalent price cannot be set upon it, but perhaps it is sufficient to do what one can, as in the case of the gods or one’s parents.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 695

And this is the reason why all things should have a price set upon them, because thus there may be exchange at any time, and if exchange then dealing.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 127

And whatever of such actions, arts, or sciences range under some one faculty (as under that of horsemanship the art of making bridles, and all that are connected with the manufacture of horse-furniture in general; this itself again, and every action connected with war, under the military art; and in the same way others under others), in all such, the Ends of the master-arts are more choice-worthy than those ranging under them, because it is with a view to the former that the latter are pursued.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 764

Now he that from rage kills himself, voluntarily, does this in contravention of Right Reason, which the law does not permit. He therefore acts Unjustly: but towards whom? towards the Community, not towards himself (because he suffers with his own consent, and no man can be Unjustly dealt with with his own consent), and on this principle the Community punishes him; that is a certain infamy is attached to the suicide as to one who acts Unjustly towards the Community.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 756

We have next to speak of Equity and the Equitable, that is to say, of the relations of Equity to Justice and the Equitable to the Just; for when we look into the matter the two do not appear identical nor yet different in kind; and we sometimes commend the Equitable and the man who embodies it in his actions, so that by way of praise we commonly transfer the term also to other acts instead of the term good, thus showing that the more Equitable a thing is the better it is: at other times following a certain train of reasoning we arrive at a difficulty, in that the Equitable though distinct from the Just is yet praiseworthy; it seems to follow either that the Just is not good or the Equitable not Just, since they are by hypothesis different; or if both are good then they are identical.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 757

This is a tolerably fair statement of the difficulty which on these grounds arises in respect of the Equitable; but, in fact, all these may be reconciled and really involve no contradiction: for the Equitable is Just, being also better than one form of Just, but is not better than the Just as though it were different from it in kind: Just and Equitable then are identical, and, both being good, the Equitable is the better of the two.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 681

If a man should suffer what he hath done, then there would be straightforward justice;”)

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1411

Yet perhaps it is not sufficient that men while young should get right food and tendance, but, inasmuch as they will have to practise and become accustomed to certain things even after they have attained to man’s estate, we shall want laws on these points as well, and, in fine, respecting one’s whole life, since the mass of men are amenable to compulsion rather than Reason, and to punishment rather than to a sense of honour.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1244

And that the generality of men are accustomed to apply the term to denominate those who do give such things to themselves is quite plain: suppose, for instance, that a man were anxious to do, more than other men, acts of justice, or self-mastery, or any other virtuous acts, and, in general, were to secure to himself that which is abstractedly noble and honourable, no one would call him Self-loving, nor blame him.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1283

But their presence has probably a mixed effect: I mean, not only is the very seeing friends pleasant, especially to one in misfortune, and actual help towards lessening the grief is afforded (the natural tendency of a friend, if he is gifted with tact, being to comfort by look and word, because he is well acquainted with the sufferer’s temper and disposition and therefore knows what things give him pleasure and pain), but also the perceiving a friend to be grieved at his misfortunes causes the sufferer pain, because every one avoids being cause of pain to his friends.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1065

The young are also much given up to Love; this passion being, in great measure, a matter of impulse and based on pleasure: for which cause they conceive Friendships and quickly drop them, changing often in the same day: but these wish for society and intimate intercourse with their friends, since they thus attain the object of their Friendship.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1438

[4] Ἀρχὴ is a word used in this treatise in various significations. The primary one is “beginning or first cause,” and this runs through all its various uses.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 860

Now Practical Wisdom is not identical with Cleverness, nor is it without this power of adapting means to ends: but this Eye of the Soul (as we may call it) does not attain its proper state without goodness, as we have said before and as is quite plain, because the syllogisms into which Moral Action may be analysed have for their Major Premiss,[53] “since —— is the End and the Chief Good”[54] (fill up the blank with just anything you please, for we merely want to exhibit the Form, so that anything will do), but _how_ this blank should be filled is seen only by the good man: because Vice distorts the moral vision and causes men to be deceived in respect of practical principles.[55]

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 149

Now the many are plainly quite slavish, choosing a life like that of brute animals: yet they obtain some consideration, because many of the great share the tastes of Sardanapalus. The refined and active again conceive it to be honour: for this may be said to be the end of the life in society: yet it is plainly too superficial for the object of our search, because it is thought to rest with those who pay rather than with him who receives it, whereas the Chief Good we feel instinctively must be something which is our own, and not easily to be taken from us.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 724

I mention these cases, because there are many natural things which we do and suffer knowingly but still no one of which is either voluntary or involuntary, growing old, or dying, for instance.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1341

And that Pleasure does arise upon the exercise of every Percipient Faculty is evident, for we commonly say that sights and sounds are pleasant; it is plain also that this is especially the case when the Faculty is most excellent and works upon a similar Object: and when both the Object and Faculty of Perception are such, Pleasure will always exist, supposing of course an agent and a patient.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1095

And the same results do not accrue to each from the other, nor in fact ought they to be looked for: but, when children render to their parents what they ought to the authors of their being, and parents to their sons what they ought to their offspring, the Friendship between such parties will be permanent and equitable.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 139

Let thus much suffice by way of preface on these three points, the student, the spirit in which our observations should be received, and the object which we propose.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 238

So then the statesman is to consider the nature of the Soul: but he must do so with these objects in view, and so far only as may suffice for the objects of his special enquiry: for to carry his speculations to a greater exactness is perhaps a task more laborious than falls within his province.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1329

Now what it is, and how characterised, will be more plain if we take up the subject afresh.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1636

{ [Greek: to men hygieias poiætikon], [Greek: hygieinon legetai] { [Greek: to de phylaktikon], { [Greek: to de sæmantikon].

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 733

Now a question may be raised whether we have spoken with sufficient distinctness as to being unjustly dealt with, and dealing unjustly towards others.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 298

Again, one may go wrong in many different ways (because, as the Pythagoreans expressed it, evil is of the class of the infinite, good of the finite), but right only in one; and so the former is easy, the latter difficult; easy to miss the mark, but hard to hit it: and for these reasons, therefore, both the excess and defect belong to Vice, and the mean state to Virtue; for, as the poet has it,

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 412

And so too is Vice: because wherever it is in our power to do it is also in our power to forbear doing, and _vice versâ_: therefore if the doing (being in a given case creditable) is in our power, so too is the forbearing (which is in the same case discreditable), and _vice versâ_.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 128

(And in this comparison it makes no difference whether the acts of working are themselves the Ends of the actions, or something further beside them, as is the case in the arts and sciences we have been just speaking of.)

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 425

But suppose a man to say, “that (by our own admission) all men aim at that which conveys to their minds an impression of good, and that men have no control over this impression, but that the End impresses each with a notion correspondent to his own individual character; that to be sure if each man is in a way the cause of his own moral state, so he will be also of the kind of impression he receives: whereas, if this is not so, no one is the cause to himself of doing evil actions, but he does them by reason of ignorance of the true End, supposing that through their means he will secure the chief good.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 944

It is plain then that the object-matter of Imperfect Self-Control and Self-Control is restricted to the same as that of utter absence of Self-Control and that of Perfected Self-Mastery, and that the rest is the object-matter of a different species so named metaphorically and not simply: we will now examine the position, “that Imperfect Self-Control in respect of Anger is less disgraceful than that in respect of Lusts.”

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1348

Thus the Pleasures aid in increasing the Workings, and things which do so aid are proper and peculiar: but the things which are proper and peculiar to others specifically different are themselves also specifically different.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1442

Thus we say that the desire of human praise was the motive of the Pharisees, or the principle on which they acted.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 266

For Moral Virtue has for its object-matter pleasures and pains, because by reason of pleasure we do what is bad, and by reason of pain decline doing what is right (for which cause, as Plato observes, men should have been trained straight from their childhood to receive pleasure and pain from proper objects, for this is the right education).

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 819

Of Practical Wisdom exerted upon a community that which I would call the Supreme is the faculty of Legislation; the subordinate, which is concerned with the details, generally has the common name πολιτικὴ, and its functions are Action and Deliberation (for the particular enactment is a matter of action, being the ultimate issue of this branch of Practical Wisdom, and therefore people commonly say, that these men alone are really engaged in government, because they alone act, filling the same place relatively to legislators, that workmen do to a master).[27]

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 362

Again, every bad man is ignorant what he ought to do and what to leave undone, and by reason of such error men become unjust and wholly evil.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 940

The having any of these inclinations is something foreign to what is denominated Vice, just as Brutishness is: and when a man has them his mastering them is not properly Self-Control, nor his being mastered by them Imperfection of Self-Control in the proper sense, but only in the way of resemblance; just as we may say a man of ungovernable wrath fails of Self-Control in respect of anger but not simply fails of Self-Control.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 467

For this reason it is thought to be a greater proof of Courage to be fearless and undisturbed under the pressure of sudden fear than under that which may be anticipated, because Courage then comes rather from a fixed habit, or less from preparation: since as to foreseen dangers a man might take his line even from calculation and reasoning, but in those which are sudden he will do so according to his fixed habit of mind.

Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1675

[4] Cardwell’s reading, [Greek: tautae gar omoioi, kai ta loipa] is here adopted, as yielding a better sense than Bekker’s.

Nicomachean Ethics

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